We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm's output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm's output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm's owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.
Introduction
Much investment in infrastructure is irreversible, and the technology of, and demand for, infrastructure assets fluctuate over time. 1 These features combine to create the risk that investment will become uneconomic before the end of its physical life, at some date that is difficult to predict. Investment type, amount, and timing will all be sensitive to the regulatory scheme, and determine its utility.
In the 1980s and 1990s incentive regulation replaced rate of return regulation as the regulatory scheme of choice for many infrastructure industries (see Laffont & Tirole, 1993, Section 2.2; Sappington, 2002) . Under both forms of regulation the regulated entity is required to invest and produce over time subject to price constraints. Typically, entry is prohibited under traditional rate of return, or cost of service, regulation and the firm is allowed to adjust its prices so that it can recover the cost of its sunk investments, even those which are unproductive: concomitantly consumers bear the risks of adverse demand and technology shocks. 2 Modern incentive regulation was designed to mimic competitive markets by allowing entry and providing incentives for the firm to, largely, act as if the only effect of regulation were to set a price cap that would otherwise be imposed by competition. It allows the regulated firm to collect revenue based upon the costs faced by a hypothetical "efficient" replacement firm, thereby exposing regulated firms to the additional risk that capital prices and demand, and therefore allowed revenue, will fall in the future. For example, the FCC's starting point in its TELRIC calculation is the cost structure of an efficient cost-minimizing firm with an optimally configured network built with the current technology (Weisman, 2002) .
We present a model featuring uncertain future demand and capital prices, irreversible investment, economies of scale in investment, and a regulator who sets the firm's output price at discrete intervals. Using this model, we determine the reward, in the form of the rate of return allowed by the regulator, which shareholders should receive for the exposure to demand risk and capital price risk induced by incentive regulation. Specifically, we derive a closed-form solution for the firm's allowed revenue that ensures that the regulated firm breaks even whenever it has to invest. The regulated price depends on the systematic risk of demand and capital price shocks, but other factors, including the extent of unsystematic risk, are also important. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm's owners, and that this is reflected in a higher regulated price.
The combination of irreversible investment, economies of scale in investment, and uncertainty complicates the firm's investment problem: it must balance (i) the benefit of exploiting economies of scale by building large amounts of excess capacity in advance of demand, and (ii) the cost of destroying its real option to wait and see if demand grows enough to justify large increases in capacity. As a result, the firm will optimally invest in a sequence of steps, building some excess capacity at each step, but always retaining some flexibility in case demand falls. Because a hypothetical replacement firm did not need to face these historical uncertainties, it can build a network to replace the existing one with a single investment-in
